A Precautionary-Principled Approach Towards Uncertain Risks: Review and Decision-Theoretic Elaboration by Vlek, Ch. (Charles)
  
 
 
 
A PRECAUTIONARY-PRINCIPLED APPROACH 
TOWARDS UNCERTAIN RISKS: REVIEW AND 
DECISION-THEORETIC ELABORATION 
 
 
Charles Vlek∗
                                                     
∗
 Charles Vlek is professor emeritus of environmental psychology and decision 
research in the Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences, Groningen University, 
Groningen The Netherlands; <c.a.j.vlek@rug.nl>. The author has profited from a 
three-year period of chairing an advisory committee of the Health Council of The 
Netherlands (see Health Council, ‘Voorzorg met Rede’ [Precaution with Reason] no. 
2008/18 (The Hague: Gezondheidsraad 2008)). Special thanks are due to staff 
members Wim Passchier, Nienke van Kuijeren, and Harrie van Dijk, and to the 
various committee members. However, since the views and conclusions in the 
present paper also result from substantial additional work, they are the personal 
responsibility of the author.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Precautionary judgment, decision, and action are needed in situations involving 
serious uncertain risk. Examples are mountain climbing, nanotechnology, 
global warming, and international terrorism. The history of the Precautionary 
Principle (PP) shows that its proponents and opponents have different 
appraisals of probabilistic risk analysis. However, modern ‘risk governance’ 
and precautionary safety management seem to be converging into a balance of 
useful substance and feasible procedure. In this paper, the PP is unfolded as a 
three-way principle for risk assessment, decision-making, and risk control. For 
an integrative circumscription of the PP, ten key issues are identified. These are 
discussed one by one, whereby ‘rational’ precautionary decision-making is 
particularly illustrated via the concrete example of a railway bomb alarm. It is 
argued that a substantive-analytical framework is indispensable, that a decision-
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theoretic perspective may offer useful guidance, that the PP is a rational 
(survival) rather than a normative (ideological) principle, that the need to avoid 
false negatives versus false positives may well differ among distinct policy 
domains, and that precautionary ‘pessimism’ should stimulate towards 
improved, multi-sided control of uncertain risks. Concluding questions are 
answered and research suggestions are formulated. 
 
 
1 Introduction and overview 
 
The ongoing international debate about the Precautionary Principle (PP) 
continues to plague policy-makers, entrepreneurs, and scientists around the 
world. The crucial question is not ‘What does the PP practically involve?’, 
but rather ‘How could uncertain risks be adequately assessed and managed?’ 
This paper is meant to provide a review and decision-theoretic clarification 
of the PP, as a basis for a practical approach towards uncertain-risk 
situations. An attempt is made to balance a sociological and legal inclination 
– it seems – towards careful procedures, against an economic and 
psychological quest for meaningful substance. 
 
1.1 Emergence of the Precautionary Principle  
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the PP emerged as a management perspective for 
dealing with serious uncertain risks for the natural environment and for 
public health. Original domains of precautionary action were the marine 
environment and the use of hazardous chemicals.1 A precautionary approach 
had already been adopted in the US Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 
1972, and during the 1970s for an international moratorium on commercial 
whaling.2 Other areas of application were atmospheric pollution, global 
warming, and climate change.3 Biosafety and the safety of food and 
                                                     
1
 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and Other Matter 1972, and 1996 Protocol Thereto (London: International Maritime 
Organisation 1972/2003), < http://www.imo.org>; M. Karlsson, ‘The pre-cautionary 
principle, Swedish chemicals policy and sustainable development’ (2006) 9 Journal 
of Risk Research 337. 
2
 D. Bodansky, ‘Scientific uncertainty and the precautionary principle’ (1991) 33 
Environment 4 at 4 and 43. 
3
 UNEP, United Nations Environment Program, The Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987) available at <http://www.unep.org/ 
ozone>; UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Kyoto Protocol (1997) available at <http://unfccc.int> or <http://unep.org/climate 
change/>. 
  
 
 
2009]  A precautionary-principled approach  131  
 
 
foodstuffs were explicitly brought under the PP somewhat later,4 while 
nanotechnology is currently gaining precautionary attention.5 
More recently, the PP has also been appreciated in connection with 
threats from international terrorism; the USA’s ‘pre-emptive strike’ against 
Iraq in March 2003 was presented officially as a precautionary strategy 
under the uncertain risk of ‘weapons of mass destruction’.6 Since the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001, on the New York WTC towers and the 
Pentagon building in Washington D.C., precautionary anti-terrorism policies 
have also been developed in several European countries, notably Spain, 
Great Britain, Denmark, and The Netherlands.7 
Since its official adoption as Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration,8 the 
PP has been spreading as part of national and international policy-making, 
especially in EU countries.9 However, the UK House of Commons,10 
apparently discontented with the European Commission’s circumscription of 
the PP, has expressed scepticism about the ‘ill-defined and practically 
unsatisfactory’ PP and has recommended that the government not use the 
term.11 The UN/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission also decided not to 
                                                     
4
 United Nations, Carthagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (Montreal, 29 January 2000) available at <www.cbd.int/biosafety/protocol/ 
shtml>; WTO, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement) (Geneva: World Trade Organization 1994) available at 
<http://www.wto.org>. 
5
 R. Haum and others, Nanotechnology and regulation within the framework of the 
precautionary principle (Berlin: Institut für Ökologische Wirtschaftsforschung 
2004) available at <http://www.ioew.de> (accessed December 2004)  
6
 R. Jervis, ‘Reports, politics, and intelligence failures: The case of Iraq’ (2006) 29 
The Journal of Strategic Studies 3; J. Stern and J.B. Wiener, ‘Precaution against 
terrorism’ (2006) 9 Journal of Risk Research 393. 
7
 M. J. Borgers, De vlucht naar voren [The flight forward] - Inaugural address, Free 
University of Amsterdam (The Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2007), discusses 
relevant changes in Dutch criminal law. 
8
 UNCED, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 1992 (see 
Table 2 below).  
9
 EC, European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the 
precautionary principle. COM (2000) 1 [Summary-2007 at  <http://europa.eu/scad 
plus/glossary/precautionary_principle_nl.htm>]; EC, European Commission, The 
White Paper on Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy COM (2001) 88 Final; 
Republique Française, Charte de l’Environnement (2005) Loi constitutionelle nº 
2005-205 du 1er mars 2005 Paris. 
10
 UK House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology, Science 
and Technology: Fourth Report (London, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office 2006), 
ch. 4: ‘The Precautionary Principle’ available at <www.publications.parliament.uk/ 
pa/cm 200506/ cmselect/cmsctech/1030/103007>. 
11
 EC (2000), above n. 9. 
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adopt the PP explicitly in its Working Principles for Risk Analysis.12 
 
1.2 Scientific debate and controversy 
 
Nevertheless, almost in concert with the international reception of the PP as 
a policy principle, a lively and sometimes fierce scientific debate has arisen 
concerning its actual meaning and practical application. As an early skeptic, 
Bodansky raised several questions that are still haunting proponents today.13  
Active promoters of the PP are Grandjean,14 Hansen,15 Latour,16 Martuzzi,17 
O’Riordan,18 Sandin,19 and Weiss.20 Vigourous critics are Bergkamp,21 
Entine,22 Hanekamp,23 IEM,24 Majone,25 Marchant,26 Peterson,27 and 
                                                     
12
 Codex Alimentarius Commission, Working Principles for Risk Analysis for 
Application in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius (2007) available at 
<http:/www.fao.org/docrep/006/y4800e/y4800e0o/htm> (Accessed 29 October 
2007). 
13
 Bodansky, above n. 2.   
14
 P. Grandjean and others, ‘Implications of the precautionary principle in research 
and policy making’ (2004) 45 American Journal of Industrial Medicine 382. 
15
 S.F. Hansen, L. Carlsen and J.A. Tickner, ‘Chemicals regulation and precaution: 
does REACH really incorporate the precautionary principle?’ (2007) 10 Environ-
mental Science and Policy 395. 
16
 B. Latour, ’Du principe de précaution au principe du bon gouvernement: vers de 
nouvelles règles de la méthode expérimentale’ (2000) available at <http://www. 
bruno-latour.fr/poparticles/poparticle/p088.html>. 
17
 M. Martuzzi, ‘The precautionary principle: in action for public health’ (2007) 64 
Occupational and Environmental Medicine 569. 
18
 T. O’Riordan, ‘The precautionary principle in environmental management’ in 
R.U. Ayres and U.E. Simonis (eds.), Industrial Metabolism: Restructuring for 
Sustainable Development (Tokyo: The United Nations University 1994).  
19
 P. Sandin and others, ‘Five charges against the precautionary principle’ (2002) 5 
Journal of Risk Research 287.  
20
 Ch. Weiss, ‘Scientific uncertainty and science-based precaution’ (2003) 3 
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 137. 
21
 L. Bergkamp, ‘Understanding the precautionary principle’ in Environmental 
Liability (Brussels: Hunton & Williams 2002) 10, 1: Part 1, 18-30; 10, 2: Part II, 67-
82. 
22
 J. Entine, Let them eat precaution (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute, AEI Press 2006). 
23
 J.C. Hanekamp, ‘Precaution and cholera: a response to Tickner and Gouvea-
Vigeant’ (2006) 26 Risk Analysis 1013. 
24
 IEM, Economic note: Precaution with the precautionary principle (Bruxelles: 
Institut Économique Molinari 2005) available at: <www.institutmolinari.org>. 
25
  G. Majone, ‘What price safety? The precautionary principle and its policy 
implications’ (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 89. 
26
 G.E. Marchant, ‘The precautionary principle: an unprincipled approach to 
biotechnology regulation’ (2001) 45 Journal of Risk Research 143. 
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Sunstein.28  
The controversiality of the PP is focused on its ‘vague’ definition 
(‘Whát should we apply?’), its inherent pessimism aimed at avoiding false 
negatives (i.e. neglect of real danger), its dependence on plausibility 
reasoning, the lack of comparative risk evaluation, its openness as regards 
legal obligations, and its implied shift in the burden of proof. Other key 
issues (see Table 3 below) have been criticised to a lesser extent, although in 
practice they may prove problematic as well.  
 
1.3 Being precautious from principle to practice 
 
The PP involves a principal attitude of provisional caution or circumspection 
towards serious uncertain risks, under pessimistic assumptions about 
possible negative outcomes.29 For practical application, the PP may be 
unfolded as:  
a. an assessment principle focused on evidentiary rules and plausibility 
judgment; 
b. a decision principle focused on the evaluation of alternative courses of 
action; 
c. a control principle focused on the practical realisation of precautionary 
safety.  
Thus, clear answers are given to the ‘why, what, and how?’ 
question: Why be precautious? What must be done? How should this be 
done? Then follows the ‘Who?’ question, about the role of authorities and 
other parties responsible for uncertain-risk assessment and management. 
 
1.4 Organisation of the paper 
 
We first consider the types of uncertain risk for which the PP seems most 
properly invoked, and we look briefly into the basic criticisms and 
developments of probabilistic risk analysis. Several PP definitions are 
presented in Section 3, where ten key issues are identified and an integrative 
                                                                                                                            
27
 M. Peterson, ‘The precautionary principle should not be used as a basis for 
decision-making’ (2007) 8 EMBO Reports, European Molecular Biology 
Organization 305. 
28
 C.S. Sunstein, ‘Beyond the precautionary principle’ (2003) 151 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1003. 
29
 G. Immordino, ‘Looking for a guide to protect the environment: the development 
of the precautionary principle’ (2003) 17 Journal of Economic Surveys 629; Ph. 
Kourilsky and G. Viney, Le Principe de Précaution. Rapport au Premier Ministre 
(15 Octobre 1999) (Paris: La Documentation Française/Éditions Odile Jacob 2000). 
Also available at <http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/004000402/ 
0000.pdf>; Ch. Weiss, ‘Can there be science-based precaution? Institute of Physics 
Publishing’ (2006) 1 Environmental Research Letters 1. 
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circumscription is proposed. In Section 4, five substantive issues are 
discussed from a largely decision-theoretic perspective. Critical points of 
understanding are illustrated via the concrete example of a railway bomb 
alarm. Section 5 deals with five largely procedural PP issues.  In Section 6, 
concluding answers are given to various general questions about 
precautionary risk management, and research suggestions are formulated.  
 
 
2 Uncertain risks and the development of risk analysis 
 
The enormous technological development and economic expansion in the 
industrial countries since World War II have gradually caused new risks to 
arise with respect to public health and safety, and to environmental security. 
Well-known risk sources are synthetic chemicals, nuclear power, large-scale 
fossil-fuel combustion, genetically modified organisms (GMOs), avian 
influenza, and nanotechnology. The risks involved may be called 
‘environmental’, but in most cases public health seems equally at stake. At 
the heart of the ‘new risk’ issues are uncertainties about problem boundaries, 
the sources of risk, dose-effect relationships, risk-reduction options and their 
costs, and the seriousness of possible consequences. The simple fact that 
different stakeholders are involved underlies the socio-political 
controversiality of such problems.  
In view of various dimensions of risk,30 we may summarily conclude 
that problematic ‘new risks’ are characterised by complexity, spatial and 
temporal extent, potential catastrophality, improbability, diverse 
uncertainties, plurality of perspectives, and learning-with-time.31 Such 
                                                     
30
 See U. Beck, ‘The terrorist threat: world risk society revisited’ (2002) 19 Theory, 
Culture and Society 39; see also D. Matten, ‘The impact of the risk society thesis on 
environmental politics and management in a globalizing economy – principles, 
proficiency, perspectives’ (2004) 7 Journal of Risk Research 377; A. Klinke and O. 
Renn. ‘A new approach to risk evaluation and management: risk-based, precaution-
based, and discourse-based strategies’ (2002) 22 Risk Analysis 1071; T. Page, ‘A 
generic view of toxic chemicals and similar risks’ (1978) 7 Ecological Law 
Quarterly 207; RIVM (National Institute for Public Health and Environmental 
Protection), Zorgen voor Morgen; Nationale Milieuverkenning 1990-2005 (Concern 
for Tomorrow; National Environmental Outlook 1990-2005) (Bilthoven, Alphen a/d 
Rijn: Samson Tjeenk Willink 1988); P. Slovic, B. Fischhoff and S. Lichtenstein, 
‘Facts and fears: understanding perceived risk’ in R.C. Schwing and E. Albers Jr. 
(eds.), Societal risk assessment: how safe is safe enough? (New York: Plenum 1980); 
Ch. Vlek and G.B. Keren, ‘Behavioral decision theory and environmental risk 
management: assessment and resolution of four 'survival' dilemmas’ (1992) 80 Acta 
Psychologica 249. 
31
 Klinke and Renn’s distinction among simple, complex, uncertain and 
(sociopolitically) ambiguous risk problems indicates some important aspects of the 
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general characteristics may be supplemented with more specific features like 
the more or less gradual development of risk (as in atmospheric pollution), 
the relative modesty of expected benefits (as in food supplements?), either 
social (‘diffuse’) or individual (‘point’) sources of risk, and the costs of 
reversing or compensating for eventual harm or damage.  
Table 1 gives a condensed categorisation of different types of 
uncertain-risk situations, showing one specific example per cell. The ‘short-
term, local criminal’ problem of a railway bomb alarm is decision-analysed 
in Section 4.4.4. 
 
Table 1 Condensed categorisation of uncertain-risk situations.  
 
Human-caused  
Focus of risk  
 
 
Natural Criminal 
action1) 
Point 
source 
Diffuse 
sources 
Local Avalanche Railway 
bomb- 
alarm 
LPG/LNG 
BLEVE2) Electr. power  blackout 
Sh
or
t-t
er
m
 
Extensive Heavy  
storm  
Football  
hooliganism 
Oil tanker  
crash BSE crisis (1996-) 
Local Volcanic 
eruption 
WTC attack 
 ‘9/11’  
Nuclear  
waste 
Urban air  
pollution 
 
 
 
 
Lo
ng
-
te
rm
 
Extensive Seaquake 
tsunami Genocide  (WW-II,  
Ruanda, 
Darfur) 
Bhopal 
MIC3  
Gas 
release  
(1984) 
GMO- 
technology 
 
1)
  Here, the point versus diffuse sources distinction is not made explicit. 
2)
  BLEVE = Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion.  
3)
  MIC= methylisocyanate. 
 
2.1 Criticisms of probabilistic risk assessment and management 
 
Already in the early days of probabilistic risk analysis (PRA), uncertainty 
about probabilities and about possible consequences was a major source of 
doubt with regard to PRA’s potential as a basis for responsible risk 
                                                                                                                            
‘new risks’. Klinke and Renn, above n. 30. However, it would seem that ambiguity 
often flows from uncertainty, which itself flows from complexity, and there are 
other important aspects as well. 
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assessment and management; see, for instance, Lewis’32 critique of the 
reactor-safety study Wash-1400.33 In view of the many time-honoured 
criticisms (see references below), we may generally conclude that: (a) a 
formal concept of risk and the notion of model rationality properly apply 
only to reasonably well-defined risk problems; (b) probabilistic risk analysis 
has always had to grapple with assessment uncertainties; (c) the social 
dynamics of safety management (in design, decision, and control) are hard to 
model predictively a priori; and (d) often different scientific and social 
perspectives on risk assessment and management may be equally valid.  
On the one hand, in response to these criticisms since the ‘formal-
quantitative’ 1970s, practical risk assessment and management have come a 
long way to gaining a grip on, and certainly acquiring more understanding 
of, the kind of uncertain-risk problems for which the PP is being advanced.34 
On the other hand, the PP debate has gradually become more sensitive to 
issues like credibility of evidence, cost-benefit balancing, and risk-risk trade-
offs.35 Such a rapprochement between risk-analytic and precautionary-
principled thinking meets with Majone’s (2002) critique that uncertainty 
about possible harm or damage is a continuous and not a dichotomous 
variable.36   
 
                                                     
32
 See H.W. Lewis and others, Risk assessment review group report to the the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Report no. NUREG/CR-0400 (Washington D.C., 
September 1978). 
33
 Wash-1400, Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. 
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants (Washington D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission 1975). 
34
 IRGC, White Paper on Risk Governance. Towards an Integrative Approach 
(Geneva: International Risk Governance Council 2005) available at <www.irgc. 
org>; H. Otway and  M. Peltu (eds.), Regulating industrial risks. Science, hazards 
and public protection (London: Butterworths 1985); Presidential-Congressional 
Commission, 1997; Royal Society, Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management. 
Report of a Royal Society Study Group (London: The Royal Society 1992); P.C. 
Stern and H.V. Fineberg (eds.), Understanding risk; informing decisions in a 
democratic society (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press 1996); G.M. Gray, 
‘The precautionary principle in practice: comparing US-EPA and WHO pesticide 
risk assessments’ Risk in Perspective (2004) 12 Newsletter of the Harvard Center 
for Risk Analysis, available at <www.hcra.edu>. 
35
 Cf. J.D. Graham, ‘Decision-analytic refinements of the precautionary principle’ 
(2001) 4 Journal of Risk Research 127; J. Scott and E. Vos, ‘The juridification of 
uncertainty: observations on the ambivalence of the Precautionary Principle within 
the EU and the WTO’ in C. Joerges and R. Dehousse (eds.), Good Governance in 
Europe’s Integrated Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002) at 253; Stern 
and Wiener, above n. 6; E. Stokes, ‘The EC courts’ contribution to refining the 
parameters of precaution’ (2008) 11 Journal of Risk Research 491. 
36
 Majone, above n. 25, at 104. 
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3 Definitions of the Precautionary Principle  
 
As a principle – ‘a comprehensive and fundamental law or doctrine, or a rule 
or code of conduct’ – the PP has been formulated in various ways.37 From 
the many definitions proposed, Table 2 gives four illustrative examples. 
 
Table 2 Specimen definitions of the Precautionary Principle. 
 
Strong Weak 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
ar
ro
w
 
Wingspread (1998): ‘When an activity 
raises threats of harm to human health 
or the en-vironment, precautionary 
measures should be taken even if some 
cause and effect relationships are not 
fully established scientifically. 
... the proponent of an activity ... should 
bear the burden of proof’.38 
UNCED (1992), Rio-
Declaration, Principle 15: 
‘Where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation’.39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Br
oa
d 
Unesco-COMEST (2005): ‘When 
human activities may lead to morally 
unacceptable harm that is scientifically 
plausible but uncertain, actions shall be 
taken to avoid or diminish that harm. ... 
Morally unacceptable harm is .... The 
judgment of plausibility should be 
grounded in scientific analysis. ... 
Actions should be ... proportional to the 
seriousness of the potential harm, with 
consideration of their positive and 
negative consequences. ... The choice of 
action should be the result of a 
participatory process’.40 
Graham’s (2001) extension of 
UNCED (1992): ‘Prior to 
enacting precautionary measures, 
decision makers should consider 
any potential benefits of 
unintended exposures, any 
potential risks of precautionary 
actions, and the promise of 
targeted investments in scientific 
research as a precautionary 
strategy. ... other refinements ... 
include formal measurement of 
citizen preferences about societal 
risk aversion and temporal 
preferences, concerns raised by 
Page41 more than 20 years ago’.42 
                                                     
37
 Following <www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary>. See also A. Trouwborst, 
‘The precautionary principle in general international law: combating the Babylonian 
confusion’ (2007) 16 Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 185. 
38
 ‘Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle’ (1998) 586 Rachel's 
Environment and Health Weekly. 
39
 UNCED, above n. 8. Rio-Declaration, Principle 15. 
40
 Unesco-COMEST, World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and 
Technology, The Precautionary Principle (Paris: United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization 2005). 
41
 T. Page, ‘A generic view of toxic chemicals and similar risks’ (1978) 7 Ecological 
Law Quarterly 207. 
42
 Graham’s extension of UNCED, above n. 8; Graham, above n. 35. 
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Strong, ‘obligatory’ versions of the PP such as UN General 
Assembly,43 Wingspread44 and Unesco-COMEST,45 may be distinguished 
from weak, ‘optional’ versions such as UNCED,46 EC,47 and Graham.48 
There is also a significant variation in the scope of precaution. Somewhat 
compact but open statements are those made by UNCED 49 and Resnik.50 In 
contrast, comprehensive formulations have been proposed by Graham,51 
Unesco-COMEST,52 Kourilsky and Viney,53 and Martuzzi.54 Wide-scope 
versions of the PP are explicit about such things as risk comparisons, cost-
benefit analysis, and participatory decision-making. All versions of the PP 
provoke questions about substantive and procedural methodology: How 
could this ‘principle’ be clearly elaborated and practically applied?  
After reviewing the many different proposals, one may conclude 
that, for a comprehensive circumscription of the PP, ten key issues are 
important, as listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Ten key issues for a precautionary-principled approach to uncertain 
risks. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
1. General inclination and motivation (‘Why precaution?’) 
2. Nature and seriousness of potential harm (e.g. ‘Worst case?’) 
3. Plausibility of possible harm or damage 
4. Precautionary decision-making: balancing over- vs under-protection 
5. Precautionary safety actions (‘What could we do, provisionally?’) 
6. Optional versus obligatory precaution 
7. Who carries the burden of proof of risk or safety? 
8. Further research and policy development 
9. Multiparty communication and deliberation 
10. Distribution of responsibilities (‘Who should do what, and when?’) 
_____________________________________________________________ 
                                                     
43
 United Nations General Assembly, World Charter for Nature UN GA/RES/37/7 
(New York, 28 October, 1982). 
44
 Wingspread, above n. 39. 
45
 Unesco-COMEST, above n. 40. 
46
 UNCED, above n. 8. 
47
 EC (2000), (2001), above n. 9. 
48
 Graham, above n. 35. 
49
 UNCED, above n. 8. 
50
 D.B. Resnik, ‘Is the precautionary principle unscientific?’ (2003) 34 Studies in the 
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 329. 
51
 Graham, above n. 35. 
52
 Unesco-COMEST, above n. 41. 
53
 Ph. Kourilsky and G. Viney, above n. 29. 
54
 Martuzzi, above n. 17. 
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The ten issues form the basis of a precautionary approach 
comprising both substantive and procedural elements. Key issues 1-5 are 
explained in Section 4; issues 6-10 are discussed in Section 5. 
 
3.1 An integrative circumscription of the Precautionary Principle 
 
In view of the definitions represented in Table 2 and the key issues listed in 
Table 3, a general circumscription of the PP may be given as in Box 1.55 
 
Box 1 Integrative circumscription of the Precautionary Principle 
 
The Precautionary Principle applies when people (one or more persons, a 
group, organisation, society) are confronted with a situation of serious 
uncertain risk or threat.  
 
It involves:  
• an analysis and evaluation of credible worst-case scenarios; 
• the making of epistemic judgments on the basis of incomplete 
evidence;  
• the inclination to take a cautious or ‘pessimistic’ decision about a 
provisional course of action;  
• a careful evaluation of expected costs, risks, and benefits of the target 
activity and its feasible alternatives;  
• and the timely selection and implementation of ‘reasonable’ 
precautionary (i.e. early-safety) measures.   
 
Whereby:  
• the proponent of the relevant activity has a special responsibility in 
demonstrating the likelihood of safety;  
• further research is undertaken to reduce uncertainties; 
• risk management decisions can be revised when new information 
becomes available, and 
• the entire process of assessment, decision, and control is the subject of 
open communication and an information exchange among relevant 
stakeholders; 
• supervision and coordination is undertaken by an appropriate 
independent authority.  
 
The upper five items in Box 1 cover ‘assessment, decision, and 
control’, and they largely indicate what the PP substantively involves. These 
                                                     
55
 The items in Box 1 do, of course, reflect but are not fully parallel to the issues in 
Table 2. 
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five apply to small-scale individual situations, such as undertaking a 
mountain cycling trip on a rainy day, as well as to large-scale collective 
situations, such as the international spread of avian influenza.56 The lower 
five items in Box 1 are largely procedural; in principle, they may also apply 
to small-scale activities, but typically they apply to societal risk situations in 
which responsible risk managers must eventually make decisions that can be 
well understood by all parties concerned.  
The precautionary heart of the principle is its ‘pessimistic’ or 
unusually protective inclination towards foregoing an activity or imposing 
strict(er) safety measures upon it, both of which are induced by the great 
uncertainty about possible disastrous consequences. The difference between 
weak and strong precaution (cf. Table 2) lies mainly in the greater emphasis 
on risk avoidance, ‘proving’ safety and the obligation to take safety 
measures, that characterises strong precaution.57 
In comparison to probabilistic risk analysis, Box 1 contains three 
distinctive elements: (i) the uncertain inclination of ‘pessimism’, (ii) the 
proponent’s larger burden of demonstrating the likelihood of safety, and (iii) 
a tendency to delay risk-taking until sufficient new information becomes 
available. A fourth distinctive element – multiparty deliberation – might be 
added, but this has already been recommended for quite some time, since the 
development of risk analysis (cf. Section 2).  
 
 
4 A precautionary-principled approach to uncertain-risk problems 
 
In this section, the practical meaning and application of the PP is elaborated 
in terms of substantive key issues 1-5 in Table 3, whose labels will reappear 
as subheadings below. This labelling also offers the opportunity of a 
systematic response to major criticisms of the PP, as summarised in Section 
1. 
 
4.1 General inclination and motivation 
 
A basic proposition inherent to the PP is that more caution is justified when 
there is greater uncertainty about possible negative consequences and/or 
                                                     
56
 In principle, the substantive meaning of precaution (upper five items in Box 1) 
also applies to animal behaviour: for example, in the case of a hungry fox warily 
foregoing the tempting bait in a trap. 
57
 M. Basili and M. Franzini, ‘Understanding the risk of an avian flu epidemic: 
rational waiting or precautionary failure?’ (2006) 26 Risk Analysis 617; P. Gardiner, 
‘A core precautionary principle’ (2006) 14 The Journal of Political Philosophy 33; 
J. Hughes, ‘How not to criticize the precautionary principle’ (2006) 31 Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 447. 
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about the seriousness of those consequences. Another proposition is that any 
risk problem always implies at least two choice alternatives: go/do not go, 
accept/reject, or permit/restrict. Also, there are at least two ‘states of nature’: 
there is a serious threat or there is not. This elicits two possible basic 
decision errors: (1) a false positive, when you take costly precautions while 
there actually is no threat, and (2) a false negative, when you neglect real 
danger. The gravity of these two errors is relative to the corresponding 
benefits of deciding ‘correctly’: being costly precautious when there is a 
threat, and being profitably careless when there is none. 
A further point is that a precautionary decision often is provisional; a 
revised choice can be made when new information becomes available. When 
one knows more about the possible consequences of a target course of 
action, about their manageability by further safety measures, and/or about 
feasible alternatives, then the initial cautious decision may be revised, and 
the original goal(s) may be achieved in a safer way. Thus there are in fact 
not two but three basic decision options: do, do not do, or defer (see Section 
4.4.4).  
The fundamental problem, not of the PP but of uncertain-risk 
situations, is the great uncertainty about the possibility of serious harm. This 
may lead one to call it a normative principle, but only if one does not accept 
the rationality of temporarily shrinking back from a course of action that 
might lead into disaster.58 
 
4.2 Nature and seriousness of potential harm 
 
What is a ‘serious threat’ that could initially trigger and later justify 
precaution? It must be something that could thoroughly disrupt a person’s, 
life, harming its positive development, bringing about long-term trauma, and 
causing very high costs of recovery, reversal, or compensation. Or, at the 
societal level, a serious threat might cause severe social disruption, 
environmental damage, and political shock, which would take many years, 
numerous debates, and considerable funds to overcome. In view of these 
considerations, the notion of serious harm may be assessed in terms of the 
criteria assembled in Box 2; these link up with basic results from riskrisk-
perception research.  
 
 
 
                                                     
58
 See Bergkamp, above n. 21; Peterson, above n. 27; WRR, Wetenschappelijke 
Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (Scientific Council for Government Policy), Naar 
nieuwe wegen in het milieubeleid [Towards new ways in environmental policy-
making] WRR-rapport no. 67 (Den Haag: SDU Uitgevers 2003). 
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Box 2 Criteria for assessing the seriousness of possible harm 
 
 
• Degree of harm or fatality for human, animal, and/or plant life; 
• Degree of material, economic damage; 
• Extent of social damage (number of people involved); 
• Extent of environmental damage (animals/plants, ecosystems 
involved); 
• Timing, duration, and/or persistence of harm; 
• Costs of restoring, reversing, or recovering from the damage; 
• Causation of significant social inequities in quality of life; 
• Causation of significant intergenerational inequities. 
 
 
Psychologically, a focus on possible worst cases or potential 
catastrophality is more obvious the greater the uncertainty about its actual, 
often very unlikely, occurrence.59 This ‘probability neglect’ may be 
enhanced by the emotions surrounding images of disaster.60 Godard’s61 
warning about radical ‘catastrophism’ lines up with Starr’s,62 who ascribes 
present-day ‘hypothetical fears’ (e.g. of global warming, irradiated foods, 
and GMOs) as arising from a primitive instinct to suspect the unknown, 
which leads to the PP – seen by Starr  – as a barrier to an adaptive future.63 
Thus, under great uncertainty, worst-case analysis may be inevitable, but 
‘worst-case thinking’ may be a tricky affair, which should be guarded from 
improper influences and considerations, such as special interests, 
exaggerated fears, and unreasonable assumptions. In cases of catastrophic 
potential, however, there is a high burden of proving their impossibility.64 
                                                     
59
 Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, above n. 30; Ch. Vlek and P.J. Stallen, 
‘Judging risks and benefits in the small and in the large’ (1981) 28 Organizational 
Behavior and Human Performance 235. 
60
 C.S. Sunstein, ‘Terrorism and probability neglect’ (2003a) 26 Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty 121. 
61
 O. Godard, ‘The precautionary principle and catastrophism on tenterhooks: 
lessons from constitutional reform in France’ in E. Fisher, J. Jones and R. von 
Schomberg (eds.), The Precautionary Principle and Public Policy Decision Making 
(London: Edward Elgar 2006) at 63. 
62
 Ch. Starr, ‘Hypothetical fears and quantitive risk analysis (2001) 21 Risk Analysis 
803. 
63
 Starr, above n. 63, and others, e.g., R. Pieterman, ‘Culture in the risk society. An 
essay on the rise of a precautionary culture’ (2001) 22 Zeitschrift für Rechts-
soziologie 145. 
64
 ‘Serious harm’ may not only pertain to false-negative consequences (neglecting 
real danger), since false-positive decisions (taking needless precautions) may also 
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4.3 Plausibility of possible harm or damage 
 
Uncertainty is the taproot of precaution. If one worries about a serious 
uncertain threat, a key judgment about the plausibility of possible grave 
harm or damage is needed for a take-risk versus enhance-safety decision. 
Here, the PP may function as an assessment principle. 
Uncertainty is a multifactorial concept. In a reasonably complex 
decision problem there may be uncertainty about one’s assessment of the 
status quo, one’s options and their feasibility, the likelihood of conditioning 
events, relevant cause-effect relationships, the nature of possible 
consequences and their valuation, and – after a choice to defer the decision – 
the utility of new information to be collected before reconsidering the 
decision. A great deal of the uncertainty-justifiying precaution is due to the 
time lag between cause and effect; when the latter manifests it may be too 
late to reduce or eliminate its cause.65  
 
4.3.1 Different kinds of uncertainty 
 
Focused uncertainty about serious risks may have various sources. 
Following EC: 
 
Scientific uncertainty results usually from five characteristics of the scientific 
method: the variable chosen, the measurements made, the samples drawn, the 
models used and the causal relationship employed. Scientific uncertainty may also 
arise from a controversy on existing data or lack of some relevant data. Uncertainty 
may relate to qualitative or quantitative elements of the analysis. 66 
 
Internationally, several other taxonomies have been proposed.67 From these 
                                                                                                                            
have rather bad consequences to which several of the above-listed criteria may 
apply. 
65
 F. Ewald, ‘The return of Descartes’s malicious demon: An outline of a philosophy 
of precaution’ in T. Baker and  J. Simon (eds.), Embracing Risk: The Changing 
Culture of Insurance and Responsibility (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
2002) at 273; E.D. Richter and R. Laster, ‘The precautionary principle, epide-
miology and the ethics of delay’ (2005) 11 Human and Ecological Risk Assessment 
17. 
66
 EC (2000), above n. 9, at 14. 
67
 J. Lemons, K. Shrader-Frechette and C. Cranor, ‘The precautionary principle: 
scientific uncertainty and Type I and Type II errors’ (1997) 2 Foundations of 
Science 207; M.E. Paté-Cornell, ‘Uncertainties in risk analysis: six levels of 
treatment’ (1996) 54 Reliability Engineering and Systems Safety  95; M. Regan, M. 
Colyvan and M.A. Burgman, ‘A taxonomy and treatment of uncertainty for ecology 
and conservation biology’ (2002) 12 Ecological Applications 618; C. Tannert, H.-D. 
Elvers and B. Jandrig, ‘The ethics of uncertainty’ (2007) 8 EMBO Reports, 
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we may identify four basic questions about uncertainties and their possible 
reduction: 
1. How adequate are the concepts, model, method, variables, and sample 
and data analysis used? 
2. How complex and/or variable (and thus: how unpredictable) is the 
process, object, or system we wish to understand? 
3. What and how much could in principle be known about the subject 
matter of interest? 
4. What values and/or weights should be attached to possible decision 
consequences and/or options? 
Question 1 may get higher-quality answers via better research. 
Question 2 is about inherent limited predictability which, in principle, no 
further research could improve. Question 3 in fact demands more innovative 
and pioneering research. Question 4 may reveal personal or organisational 
value diversity. The latter may be approached via social-deliberative 
procedures for judgment and decision-making, under the presumption that 
this may yield sufficient understanding and/or consensus for relevant 
decisions (see further Section 5). 
 
4.3.2 Judging the plausibility of serious harm 
 
To prevent unfounded presuppositions, assumptions, and imaginings from 
playing a significant role in precautionary policies, epistemic criteria are 
needed to judge the plausibility of possible serious effects, in the shorter and 
the longer term, of target activities or developments.  
More than 40 years ago, Hill considered a set of criteria for inferring 
a causal relationship from an observed association between phenomena A 
(e.g. an environmental condition) and B (e.g. a health condition),68 as 
summarised in the left column of Table 4.69 The right column lists six 
criteria for judging the plausibility of a hypothesis (e.g. about a serious 
threat) as proposed by Resnik.70  
 
                                                                                                                            
European Molecular Biology Organization 892; M.B.A. van Asselt, Perspectives on 
Uncertainty and Risk (Dordrecht: Kluwer 2000). 
68
 A.B. Hill, ‘The environment and disease: association or causation?’ Proceedings 
of the Royal Society of Medicine, Section of Occupational Medicine, Meeting of 
January 14, 1965 (London: Royal Society of Medicine 1965) at 295. 
69
 Hill nicely quotes the famous detective Sherlock Holmes as having said: ‘When 
you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must 
be the truth.’ (Hill’s italics); Hill, above n. 69, at 298. 
70
 Resnik, above n. 51. 
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Table 4 Hill’s and Resnik’s criteria for judging plausibility of causality 
 
 
Hill’s criteria for causality 
judgment 
 
 
Resnik’s epistemic criteria for 
plausibility 
1. *Strength of association 
2. *Consistency of association 
3. Specificity of association 
4. Temporality of association 
5. *Biological gradient of 
association (dose-response curve) 
6. *Plausibility of association (after 
elimination of the impossible) 
7. Coherence of causal 
interpretation with known facts 
8. Experimental test of causality 
9. Analogy of association with 
other, known cause-effect 
relationships 
 
1. Coherence (consistency of 
background knowledge and 
theories) 
2. Explanatory power 
3. Analogy (to similar, well-
understood mechanisms and 
processes) 
4. Precedence (similar to 
previously observed events) 
5. Precision (the hypothesis 
should be reasonably precise) 
6. Simplicity (the hypothesis 
should be parsimonious) 
 
 
Note: *Asterisked Hill-criteria are most often used by practitioners, following 
Weed.71 
 
These and similar sets of criteria hold the message that, under major 
uncertainty, the plausibility of a hypothesis about a causal relationship – or 
of finding an alternative course of action, or of discovering hitherto 
unknown possible consequences, for that matter – always is a tentative, 
fumble-and-grope affair. It is a scientist’s ‘best bet’, whereby one may 
eventually turn out to be right or wrong, since nature ultimately determines 
the actual outcome.72 
 
4.3.3 Evidence scales and standards of proof 
 
The extent to which a given phenomenon (often a cause-effect relationship) 
occurs may be expressed as a greater or lesser probability or plausibility. We 
should remember that probability is a mathematical concept ranging from 0: 
impossibility, to 1: necessity of occurrence. Probability measures should 
                                                     
71
 D.L. Weed, ’Precaution, prevention, and public health ethics’ (2004) 29 Journal 
of Medicine and Philosophy 313. 
72
 Extreme uncertainty, of course, comes close to total ignorance, whereby the 
English proverb may apply: ‘Where nought’s to be got, kings lose their scot.’ 
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fulfil a limited set of measurement axioms: for example, that the 
probabilities of an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive events should 
amount to 1.  
In contrast, or rather, in supplement to, the notion of plausibility 
reflects a combination of possibility (‘cannot be excluded’) and a vague but 
a priori low likelihood (‘worth looking into’). Traditionally, scientists don’t 
like ‘plausibility reasoning’73 and it has been argued that the controversial 
PP derives from the limitations of scientific knowledge.74 
Scales covering various degrees of evidence and their implication for 
decision-making have been assembled by IARC,75 Weiss76 and Wiedemann, 
Mertens, and others.77 After a careful comparison of legal, scientific, and 
Bayesian-statistical levels of uncertainty, Weiss proposes the ten-point 
‘subjective scale of scientific certainty’ as summarised in Table 5;78 the final 
column indicates the corresponding evidentiary qualifications of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its Fourth 
Assessment Report.79  
 
                                                     
73
 J.S. Gray, ‘Statistics and the precautionary principle’ (1990) 21 Marine Pollution 
Bulletin 174; M. Iaccarino, ‘A cost/benefit analysis. About the Precautionary 
Principle’ (2000) 1 EMBO Reports, European Molecular Biology Organization 454; 
Peterson, above n. 27; E. Soule, ‘The precautionary principle and the regulation of 
U.S. food and drug safety’ (2004) 29 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 333. 
74
 J. Van der Sluijs, ‘Uncertainty and precaution in environmental management: 
Insights from the UPEM conference’ (2007) 22 Environmental Modelling and 
Software 590. 
75
 IARC, International Agency for Research on Cancer. IARC monographs on the 
evaluation of carcinogenic risks to humans, Preamble (Lyon: World Health 
Organization-IARC 2006) available at: <http://monographs.iarc.fr/eng/preamble/ 
currentpreamble.pdf>. 
76
 Ch. Weiss, ‘Expressing scientific uncertainty’ (2003) 2 Law, Probability and Risk 
25; Ch. Weiss, above n. 29. 
77
 P.M. Wiedemann and others, Risikopotenziale elektromagnetischer Felder: 
Bewertungsansätze und Vorsorgeoptionen, Endbericht für das Bayerische Staats-
ministerium für Landesentwicklung und Umweltfragen. (Jülich: Forschungszentrum 
Jülich, Programmgruppe Mensch, Umwelt, Technik 2001). 
78
 Weiss (2003), above n. 77, Tables 2 and 3. 
79
 IPCC, ‘IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007’ (Synthesis 
Report and Working Group I-III Summaries and Reports). Geneva (CH): 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, <www.ipcc.ch>. 
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Table 5 Adapted (un)certainty scale as proposed by Weiss,80 with IPCC-
2007 column81 added 
 
Level Legal standard 
of  proof  
 
Scientific 
qualification 
Bayesian  
Probabi-
lity 
IPCC-scale of  
likelihood  
2007 
10. Beyond any 
doubt 
Experimentally 
broadly 
validated 
theory 
 
100% 
 
(None) 
   
9. 
Beyond a 
reasonable  
doubt 
Rigorously 
proven 
> 99% Virtually 
certain 
> 95% Extremely 
likely 
 
8. 
Clear and 
convincing  
evidence 
Substantially 
proven, reason- 
ably certain > 90% Very likely 
7. Clear showing Very probable 80-90% 
 
6. 
Substantial and 
credible 
evidence 
Probable, not 
fully Proven 
 
67-80% 
 
Likely 
 
 
5. 
Preponderance 
ofthe evidence 
the evidence 
More likely 
than  
not to be true 
50-67% 
4. Clear indication Attractive but  
unproven 
33-50% 
> 50%: more  
likely than not; 
33-67%: about  
as likely as not 
 
3. 
Probable cause,  
reasonable 
grounds  
for belief 
Plausible 
hypothesis 
 
10-33% 
 
Unlikely 
5-10% Very unlikely  
2. 
Reasonable, 
articulable  
grounds for 
suspicion 
Possible, worth  
investigating 1-5% Extremely  
unlikely 
 
1. 
No reasonable 
grounds  
for suspicion 
Unlikely, but  
not excludable 
< 1% Exceptionally  
unlikely 
0. Impossible Against known  
laws of science 
0% (None) 
 
                                                     
80
 Weiss, above n. 77. 
81
 IPCC (2007), above n. 80.  
  
 
 
148 Erasmus Law Review                   [Volume 02 Issue 02 
 
From a Bayesian decision-theoretic point of view, a given level of 
certainty/uncertainty or probability in Table 5 could be used in a formal 
policy ‘gamble’. One might, for example, invest more or less public money 
in developing a mitigation and/or adaptation strategy for climate change, the 
more or less certain one is about the human causes of and solutions to 
problems of climate change.  
 
4.3.4 ‘Sufficient evidence’ for diagnostic judgments 
 
How much evidence is needed, or how much uncertainty may remain before 
one embarks upon a precautionary strategy? Here, it should be realised that 
empirical scientific conclusions (e.g. about a chemical being carcinogenic, or 
an animal population being at risk) may, perhaps improbably, be wrong in 
two ways: they may be falsely positive or falsely negative. Thus, the implicit 
value question for the scientist is: What is worse? Stating that a risk is 
present when it actually is not (a false positive or Type I error), or declaring 
that there is no risk when there actually is one (false negative or Type II 
error)? The basic proposition here is that in a diagnostic choice (or 
‘epistemic decision’) between alternative hypotheses  –  risk’ versus ‘no 
risk’  – the relative seriousness of a false positive versus a false negative 
plays a crucial role.82 Or, to quote Rudner: ‘How sure we need to be before 
we accept a hypothesis will depend on how serious a mistake would be’.83 
A formal analysis of diagnostic judgment may well follow signal 
detection theory (SDT), a well-established methodology for separating an 
observer’s discriminative capacity from his/her ‘response bias’.84 According 
to SDT, the useful thing for scientists to do is to show how the probability of 
a true positive (i.e. 1 minus the probability of a false negative) is related to 
the probability of a false positive (i.e. 1 minus the probability of a true 
negative) when the evidentiary requirement is gradually relaxed (cf. Table 
5). Note that the probability of a true positive reflects the sensitivity of the 
diagnostic test (which may just be an expert’s decisive judgment), while the 
probability of a true negative reflects the test’s specificity.  
Obviously, when the evidentiary criterion is weakened, the 
probability of a true positive (and thus the test sensitivity) increases, but so 
                                                     
82
 Resnik, above n. 51. 
83
 R. Rudner, ‘The scientist qua scientist makes value judgments’ (1953) 20 
Philosophy of Science 1 at 2. 
84
 J.A. Swets, W.P. Tanner and T.G. Birdsall, ‘Decision processes in perception’ 
(1961) 68 Psychological Review 301; J.A. Swets, R.M. Dawes and J. Monahan, 
‘Psychological science can improve diagnostic decisions’ (2000) 1 Psychological 
Science in the Public Interest 1; see also S.E. Hrudey and W. Leiss. ‘Risk 
management and precaution: Insights on the cautious use of evidence’ (2003) 111 
Environmental Health Perspectives 1577. 
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does the probability of a false positive. However, for a powerful diagnostic 
test (or expert judgment), the probability of a true positive, p(TP), increases 
much faster than does the probability of a false positive, p(FP); for a weak 
test or judgment, p(TP) increases only moderately with a weakening 
criterion. In the limiting case, where the ‘risk’ and ‘no risk’ hypotheses 
cannot be empirically discriminated at all, there is an equal rate of change 
for both probabilities when the evidentiary criterion varies. 
The primary message from SDT is that there is no single absolute 
threshold level (‘sufficient evidence’ or ‘standard of proof’) for making 
sensory and/or cognitive judgments about physical signals (e.g. a warning 
sound) or more complex states of the world (e.g. serious risk), because some 
kind of response bias grounded in the relative seriousness of judgmental 
mistakes always plays a role, the more so the greater the uncertainty (the 
‘noise’) about the available evidence.  
Thus, the scientist attempting to offer useful information about an 
uncertain risk might deliver three things: (i) his/her best estimate of the 
probability that the risk hypothesis is true relative to some null hypothesis, 
(ii) a specification of the relationship between the true-positive probability 
and the false-positive probability as the evidentiary requirement varies from 
strong to weak, and (iii) a demonstration of his/her willingness to virtually 
bet on the true outcome, given certain negative utilities attached to a false-
positive (Type I error) and a false-negative (Type II error) diagnosis. These 
utilities in fact are or should be decision-maker values that do not seem to 
belong to the realm of science.85 
 
4.4 Precautionary decision-making: balancing over- versus under-
protection 
 
Deciding whether to undertake precautionary action is the centre piece of 
any approach towards uncertain-risk situations. Given that we know 
reasonably well how to avoid or diminish the relevant uncertain risk (see 
Section 4.5 about safety actions), key questions here are: How could 
decisions about uncertain-risk management best be taken? How rational 
could they be? Who should prepare and/or take such decisions? These issues 
have attracted considerable attention from theoretical economists, decision 
theorists, and risk analysts, who all seem to acknowledge that uncertainty 
itself holds limitations for rational problem solving. A concrete example is 
elaborated in Section 4.4.3. 
 
                                                     
85
 Grandjean emphasises that scientists and policy-makers naturally differ in their 
desire to avoid false positives and false negatives, respectively, Grandjean and 
others, above n. 14. 
  
 
 
150 Erasmus Law Review                   [Volume 02 Issue 02 
 
4.4.1 Limitations of rational decision-making 
 
Decision theory is meant to be a rational framework for individual (or 
single-agent) decision-making in reasonably well-defined situations.86 
‘Rational’ here means that: 
• the decision-maker obeys certain axioms such as the dominance 
principle, transitivity of preferences, and consistency of probability 
estimation;  
• relevant choice alternatives, critical uncertain events, and possible 
consequences are eventually known so that the problem structure is 
‘closed’; 
• the decision-maker can assign probabilities (however vague) to uncertain 
event-outcomes; 
• he/she can attach goal-consistent (possibly vague) utility values to 
possible consequences;  
• his/her goal is to maximise the expected utility of an action’s possible 
consequences. 
In ill-defined decision situations, one or more of the above 
conditions often can be fulfilled only with difficulty or not at all. This 
natural limitation has led to the formulation of different decision rules. 
Moreover, in multiple-stakeholder problems, the rationality of multiparty 
decision-making is limited by the interpersonal incomparability of individual 
utilities. As a result, individual preference orders of alternative courses of 
action cannot easily be aggregated into a single social preference order free 
of circularities and/or intransitivities.87 
Hence, rational decision analysis of uncertain-risk situations may be 
a useful but inherently limited tool for disciplining one’s thoughts and 
feelings about problem structuring, option evaluation, and the preferential 
ordering of choice alternatives. The surrounding context of the analysis 
proper may comprise persistent uncertainties, sheer ignorance about long-
term developments, stakeholder differences in judgments and preferences, 
and difficulties in communication between experts, policy-makers and 
judicial authorities. The contextual complexities of intentionally rational 
decision-making are clearly illustrated in the precautionary case studies 
                                                     
86
 D.V. Lindley, Making decisions (London, New York: Wiley 1985 2nd ed.); R.D. 
Luce and H. Raiffa, Games and decisions (New York: Wiley 1957). 
87
 K.J. Arrow, Social choice and individual values (New York: Wiley 1963/1951); 
D.H. Blair and R.A. Pollak, ‘Rational collective choice’ (1983) 249 Scientific 
American 76; T. Bezembinder, ‘Social choice theory and practice’ in C. Vlek and G. 
Cvetkovich (eds.), Social decision methodology for technological projects 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989) at 15. 
  
 
 
2009]  A precautionary-principled approach  151  
 
 
reported by Forrester and Hanekamp,88 Stern and Wiener,89 and Van Asselt 
and Vos. 90 
 
4.4.2 Decision rules for uncertain-risk taking 
 
As a decision principle, the PP is often related to the maximin utility (or 
payoff) criterion for decision-making under total uncertainty about which 
state of the world would obtain after a choice has been made. Under the 
‘bad-luck’ assumption that each alternative action would yield the least 
favourable consequence, one may best choose the alternative having the 
least-bad consequence (maximum minimorum). Maximin, however, is only 
one of various rules for decision-making under uncertainty. Other rules are 
maximax, minimax regret, and the principle of insufficient reason.91  
Next to these, weighted combinations of maximax and maximin, or 
of maximax/maximin and expected utility, have been proposed for 
uncertain-risk situations characterised by extreme possible consequences.92 
Various practical examples with numerical exercises might be given that 
would clearly reveal that different decision rules may lead to different 
optimal choices. This, however, would far exceed the scope of this paper.93 
Instead, the following conclusions are presented about precaution via formal 
decision rules. 
1. For reasonably well-defined decision problems – with known options, 
states, and payoffs or utilities – under full uncertainty about which state 
of the world would obtain, there exist different formal decision rules that 
may lead to different optimal choices depending on what exactly one 
wishes to maximise or to minimise. Among these, ‘Maximin’ would 
reflect an indiscriminate belief in bad luck whatever one chooses. 
                                                     
88
 I. Forrester and J.C. Hanekamp, ‘Precaution, science and jurisprudence: a test 
case’ (2006) 9 Journal of Risk Research 297, 
89
 Stern and Wiener, above n. 6. 
90
 M.B.A. van Asselt and E. Vos, ‘The precautionary principle in times of 
intermingled uncertainty and risk: some regulatory complexities’ (2005) 52 Water 
Science and Technology 35. 
91
 See Luce and Raiffa, above n. 87. 
92
 M. Basili, ‘A rational decision rule with extreme events’ (2006) 26 Risk Analysis 
1721; Basili and Franzini, above n. 58; C. Henry, ‘Decision-making under scientific, 
political and economic uncertainty’ (2006) Working Paper Laboratoire 
d’Économetrie, École Polytechnique, available at  <economix.u-paris10.fr/pdf.sem 
_economix/2006-10-12.Henry.pdf>; D. Kelsey and J. Quiggin, ‘Theories of choice 
under uncertainty’ (1992) 6 Journal of Economic Surveys 133. 
93
 Meanwhile, a more extensive review paper has been completed about different 
formal models and rules for  decision-making under substantial uncertain risk (Ch. 
Vlek, ‘Judicious management of uncertain risks: II. Simple rules and more intricate 
models for precautionary decision-making’; 2009, submitted for publication). 
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Similarly, ‘Maximax’ would reflect an indiscriminate belief in good 
luck. Formally, such consequence-pessimism/optimism follows a 
weighted combination of the minimum and maximum possible 
consequence-utilities (or payoffs) per option, Min + (1-)Max, 
whereby 0    1 reflects the degree of consequence-pessimism.  
2. Alternatively, partial uncertainty about future states of the world may be 
quantitatively expressed in a more or less event-pessimistic probability 
distribution. The latter may serve to compute the Expected Utility (EU) 
for each choice alternative, which EU may then be used as a 
maximisation criterion.94 Obviously, a more event-pessimistic 
probability distribution would yield a lower EU value for options 
implying a lower utility when the relevant ‘negative’ event would occur.  
3. To the extent that there is a lack of confidence in the probability 
distribution under consideration, decision-makers may attenuate the 
significance of the resulting EU (using a less-than-full-confidence 
parameter 0    1) and assign relative greater (additional) weight 1- 
to some combination of the plausible minimum and maximum 
consequences of each option.95 The latter themselves may also be 
differentially weighted following a consequence-pessimism parameter 0 
   1, as above. This may be called the W(eighted)EU-UMin/UMax 
decision rule. The parameter  would reflect the degree of probability 
confidence. 
4. When more than one probability distribution over the possible uncertain-
event outcomes is considered (e.g. as a result of different experts’ 
advice), the decision-maker may: 
a. follow the ‘Maximin EU’ rule and choose the option for 
which the minimal EU over distributions is maximal across 
the set of choice alternatives (quite analogous to the pure 
maximin rule); 
b. follow a -weighted combination of the minimum and 
maximum EU values per choice alternative and choose the 
option for which the Weighted-EUMin/EUMax value is largest 
(quite analogous to the pure -weighted Maximin/Maximax 
rule). The parameter  would reflect the decision-maker’s 
degree of ambiguity aversion. 
5. ‘Pessimism’ (or rather, fear or aversion) may also be expressed in an 
especially negative evaluation of the most undesirable plausible 
consequences, which optimists in turn may not interpret as 
                                                     
94
 Expected Utility simply is the sum of probability-weighted utilities of possible 
consequences. This is demonstrated in Section 4.4.3. 
95
 Some (probability) weight of the utilities of extreme consequences is already 
implied in the EU formula. 
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catastrophically severe.96 Such differences in evaluation may be 
attributable to variations in risk exposure, system knowledge, perceived 
controllability, and personal efficacy in risk management.  
6. In general, the PP implies giving a high weight to the minimum possible 
or highest-negative utility, or expected utility, per choice alternative. As 
indicated above, the pessimism implied may have various reasons.  
7. Finally, we should note that there is no logical reason to be either 
pessimistic or optimistic in situations where probability information 
about future states of the world is lacking. If one feels strongly attracted 
by the plausible highest-utility consequence for each option (i.e. one 
consistently believes in, or hopes for good luck), then maximax utility, 
or some maximax-EU criterion, would be the decision rule to apply. In 
contrast, when one is pessimistic and fears bad luck, maximin-utility or 
maximin-EU should be followed.  
 
4.4.3 Minimal probability for an Avoid-Risk decision 
 
A signal-detection analysis of diagnostic judgment (Section 4.3.4) is only 
one step away from a full expected-utility analysis of an important 
precautionary decision problem, as presented below. Let us adapt Rudner’s 
statement slightly: ‘How sure we need to be before we accept an uncertain-
risk course of action [instead of ‘a hypothesis’] will depend on how serious a 
mistake would be’.97 This clearly means that the minimal probability of 
serious harm, however uncertain, should depend on the seriousness of a 
possible mistake when deciding in favour of a risk-avoiding versus a risk-
taking action. To appreciate this, let us elaborate the example of a suspected 
suitcase left behind (‘perhaps by a terrorist?’) on a crowded Dutch 
passsenger train, say, between Amsterdam and the Hague.98 Table 6 shows 
fictitious utility values on a 0-100 (‘worst-best’) scale for the four possible 
consequences of the authorities deciding to temporarily stop or not to stop all 
rail transport on the Amsterdam-The Hague line, under the mutually 
exclusive hypotheses that the unguarded suitcase is either harmless (H0) or 
dangerous (H1).  
Briefly, a utility scale covers personal or agency values assigned to 
possible decision consequences. These may be described initially in terms of 
‘objective’ financial, material, and/or social benefits and/or costs. Utility 
may be directly judged on a one-dimensional interval scale with an arbitrary 
                                                     
96
 For example, the release of radioactive materials from a nuclear installation may 
be evaluated by an optimist as ‘a serious but preventable accident’, while a pessimist 
may characterise the same event as ‘an alarming signal of potential catastrophe’. 
97
 Rudner, above n. 84, at 2. 
98
 Other examples from Table 1 could be analysed as well, but some cases would 
require a more complex decision model and extensive elaboration. 
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zero point and measurement unit (e.g. 0-10, 0-100, or from -10 to + 10). 
Alternatively, a multi-attribute utility model may be used, to determine for 
instance a weighted combination of utilities assessed on different 
independent attributes.99  
The four cells in Table 6 actually indicate complex consequence-
situations having both short- and long-term effects of various kinds. Thus 
their comprehensive utility assessment may require a separate exercise. 
Here, final-aggregate utility values are used that should reasonably well 
indicate the relative attractiveness/unattractiveness of the four consequence 
situations. Note that, given the utility values, none of the two options is 
dominating (i.e. always at least as good as) the other. 
 
Table 6 Fictitious utility values (U
..
) on a 0-100 scale for possible conse-
quences of a decision to to stop or not to stop all rail transport between 
Amsterdam and The Hague after the discovery of an unguarded suitcase on a 
train.  
 
 H0: suitcase is 
harmless 
H1: suitcase is 
dangerous 
Take Risk: let rail 
transport continue UT0 = 100    (TN) UT1 =  0    (FN) 
Avoid Risk: stop all rail 
transport UA0  =  60    (FP) UA1 = 80   (TP) 
 
TN = true negative, FN = false negative; FP = false positive; TP = true positive. 
 
Under a straightforward application of the maximin-utility rule (see 
above) the optimal choice here would be ‘Avoid Risk’, since its mimimal 
utility value UA0 = 60 is much higher than the minimal value UT1 = 0 for 
‘Take Risk’. Given that UT0 = 100 and UT1 = 0 are fixed as the measurement 
range and zero point of the interval utility scale, respectively, the mutual 
relations among the four utility values could only change via variations in 
UA0  en UA1; the relative focus of the evaluation thus lies in the possible 
consequences of ‘Avoid Risk’, whereby the problem-characteristic rank 
order UT0 > UA1 > UA0 > UT1 (see Table 6) should be preserved. Thus, should 
somebody come up and say: ‘Okay, but an actual bomb explosion after a 
Take-Risk decision would be really disastrous and should therefore be 
valued even more negatively’, this might be expressed through decreasing 
the differences among UT0, UA1 en UA0. This could be done by setting UA0 = 
                                                     
99
 H. Raiffa, Decision analysis. Introductory lectures on choices under uncertainty 
(Reading: Addison-Wesley 1968); K.P. Yoon and C.-L. Hwang, Multiple attribute 
decision making. An Introduction. Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social 
Sciences, no. 07-104 (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications 1995). 
  
 
 
2009]  A precautionary-principled approach  155  
 
 
90 and UA1 = 95 (instead of 60 en 80).100 
Now, given the utility values in Table 6, suppose that one would 
start from the prior probabilities p(H0) = 0.80 en p(H1) = 0.20. Thus, the 
threat would be considerable, but the probability that the suitcase is harmless 
is four times larger. The ensuing expected utility (EU) values for the two 
choice alternatives would be:  
 
EU (Take Risk) = 0.80 (100) + 0.20 (0) = 80 and 
EU (Avoid Risk) = 0.80 (60) + 0.20 (80) = 64. 
 
By implication, ‘Take Risk’ appears more attractive than ‘Avoid 
Risk’, and rail transport between Amsterdam and The Hague may best be 
continued.  
However, when the utility values of ‘false-positive’, UA0 , and ‘true-
positive’, UA1, come to lie much closer to the value of ‘true-negative’ (UT0= 
100), with UA0 = 90 en UA1 = 95 as proposed above (and whereby the threat 
would be evaluated as much worse), we would obtain: 
 
EU (Take Risk) = 0.80 (100) + 0.20 (0) = 80 and 
EU (Avoid Risk) = 0.80 (90) + 0.20 (95) = 91, 
 
whereby ‘Avoid Risk’ would be more attractive than ‘Take Risk’. More 
generally and formally, the expected utility of the two options can be 
represented as:  
 
EU(Take Risk) = p(H0). UT0 + p (H1). UT1 and 
EU(Avoid Risk) = p(H0). UA0  + p (H1). UA1. 
 
How large should the danger probability p(H1) minimally be in order 
to lead to a preference for ‘Avoid Risk’? Consider that p(H1)= 1-p(H0) and 
let p(H1) be conveniently written simply as p. Thus, 
 
EU(Take Risk) = (1-p).UT0 + p.UT1 = UT0 + p.(UT1 - UT0) and 
EU(Avoid Risk) = (1-p).UA0 + p.UA1 = UA0 + p.(UA1 - UA0). 
                                                     
100
 With this modified set of utility values, one pure-maximin condition would be 
even better fulfilled. J. Rawls, A theory of justice (Cambridge (Mass.): The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press 1971) (Revised ed. 1999: Cambridge (Mass.): 
Harvard University Press) at 152; see also Gardiner, above n. 58: the additional 
  
 
 
156 Erasmus Law Review                   [Volume 02 Issue 02 
 
The critical (as yet a priori) probability pA/T, whereby a preference 
for ‘Take Risk’ changes into  ‘Avoid Risk’, can be inferred from the 
condition in which EU(TR) = EU(AR), i.e. when 
 
UT0 + p.(UT1 - UT0) = UA0  + p.(UA1 - UA0). 
 
It follows that pA/T = (UT0 - UA0  ) / {(UT0 - UA0) + (UA1 - UT1)}, or the 
minimum p-value is: 
 
pA/T = 1 / [1 +  (UA1 - UT1) / (UT0 - UA0)]. 
 
In other words, under an Avoid-Risk decision the critical probability 
of danger is a simple function of the expected ‘satisfaction’ about a true-
positive consequence in comparison to the expected satisfaction about a true-
negative consequence under a Take-Risk decision. Inversely expressed, pA/T 
is a function of the ‘regret’ (i.e. the inverse of satisfaction) one expects to 
experience from a false-positive consequence relative to the expected regret 
under a false-negative consequence.101 
In conclusion, one’s preference for the precautionary option ‘Avoid 
Risk’, and more generally the preferred degree of precaution, is a function of 
the estimated probability of serious harm and the relative seriousness of a 
false-negative consequence compared to a false-positive consequence. Thus, 
PP proponents need not consider the initiator of an uncertain-risk activity as 
‘guilty until proven innocent’ (fearing a false negative), nor should they 
consider him or her ‘innocent until proven guilty’ (fearing a false positive); 
see Van den Belt.102 It is all a matter of weighing possible false positives 
versus false negatives, and this may have to be done differently for different 
domains such as, for instance, criminal justice, transport safety, and 
environmental protection. These conclusions and the above analysis are fully 
compatible with the signal detection-theoretic argument explained in Section 
4.3.4.103   
 
                                                                                                                            
benefits of what could be obtained above the maximin-utility value (now UA0 = 90 
instead of 60) are of limited significance only. 
101
 For lack of space, enlightening decision models about the minimisation of 
anticipated regret (e.g. M. Braun and A. Muermann, ‘The impact of regret on the 
demand for insurance’ (2004) 71 Journal of Risk and Insurance 737) cannot be 
discussed here; see Vlek, above n. 94. 
102
 H. Van den Belt, ‘Debating the precautionary principle: “guilty until proven 
innocent” or “innocent until proven guilty”?’ (2003) 132 Plant Physiology 1122. 
103
 Inspired by M.L. DeKay and others, ‘Risk-based decision analysis in support of 
precautionary policies’ (2002) 5 Journal of Risk Research 391. 
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4.4.4 Decision deferral and the value of new information  
 
For an Avoid-Risk versus Take-Risk decision, the prior probability or 
plausibility, p(H1), of serious harm plays a crucial role.104 However, prior 
beliefs may be a weak basis for justifiable decisions, except when already 
considerable, perhaps intuitive, statistical evidence is available. For example, 
one may hold a clear, low prior probability about the delayed arrival of a 
train, plane, or ferry boat. However, in fairly unique situations of uncertain 
risk the latter is rarely the case. There, often under time pressure and despite 
a lack of sufficient evidence, important choices may have to be made. 
Hence, what could or would a rational actor do to avoid simply taking 
chances?  
If at all possible, the uncertain decision-maker would prefer to gather 
new information, tx , which may lead him/her to revise the prior probability 
of harm, p(H1), into a posterior probability p(H1| tx), whereby tx represents a 
particular test result x, e.g., ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. The test may actually 
consist of systematic research, closer inspection and/or further observation 
of the situation.105 Formally, such probability revision may follow Bayes’ 
Theorem:106 
 
                   p(H1).p(tx | H1)           p(H1).p(tx | H1) 
p(H1 | tx) =  ------------------   =   -------------------------------------  .  
                        p(tx)             p(H0).p(tx | H0) + p(H1).p(tx | H1) 
 
Expressed in words, the posterior probability p(H1 | tx) of danger 
given the test result tx equals the product of the prior probability p(H1) and 
the likelihood of tx under H1, divided by the unconditonal probability of tx 
(across all available hypotheses). Thus, to revise the danger-probability 
p(H1) into a more empirically supported p(H1 | tx), it is important to know 
how likely a certain test result, say tpos, is if H1 were actually true, but also 
how likely the same tpos is when H0 is true (tpos would be indicative of serious 
danger).  
In a two-hypotheses situation, Bayes’ Theorem can be written 
conveniently in terms of the odds of H1 relative to H0:    
                                                     
104
 Decision-theoretically, a certain degree of plausibility is inevitably treated as an 
uncertain probability (having a certain confidence interval) about a particular event-
outcome. 
105
 Note that in Section 4.3.4 it is indicated that a diagnostic result tx itself may 
depend on evidence strength and seriousness of possible mistakes. 
106
 W. Edwards, H. Lindman and L.J. Savage, ‘Bayesian statistical inference for 
psychological research’ (1963) 70 Psychological Review 192; Lindley, above n. 87. 
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   p(H1 | tx)         p(H1)      p(tx | H1) 
   ----------   =   -------  .  ---------- . 
   p(H0 | tx)         p(H0)     p(tx | H0) 
 
This formula shows that the posterior odds of H1 versus H0 equal the 
product of the prior odds and the likelihood ratio of the test result in light of 
H1 versus H0. One implication of this is that when p(H1) equals p(H0), which 
would reflect perfect uncertainty, the likelihood ratio would be decisive. 
Hereby, one may hope that the latter is appreciably different from 1, 
indicating that the test itself has a significant diagnostic value; an 
undiagnostic (‘worthless’) test result would be about equally likely under 
both hypotheses – p(tx | H1)  p(tx | H0) – and would not lead to an 
appreciable change in prior probability.  
The above formula also demonstrates that the prior odds, p(H1) / 
p(H0), always have a moderating (either strengthening or weakening) effect 
on the posterior odds p(H1 | tx) / p(H0 | tx), apart from the test result tx itself 
via the likelihood ratio. Thus ‘evidence’ may or may not go against prior 
beliefs, and when the evidence is weak prior priobabilities may remain most 
important. 
 
4.4.5 Analysing the value of new information 
 
In the example discussed above, the expected utility (EU) of the actual 
decision for the optimal course of action equals: 
 
Max{EU(Take Risk), EU(Avoid Risk)},  
or:  Max{p(H0).UT0 + p (H1).UT1 , p(H0).UA0 + p (H1).UA1} ; 
 
see Section 4.4.3. After the acquiring of new information concerning H1 
versus H0 , by way of a test possibly yielding result tpos or tneg , the prior 
probability p(H1) can be revised into a posterior probability p(H1 | tx) 
carrying index x = ‘pos’ or ‘neg’ (for the test result cannot be known in 
advance).  
The obvious question then is: In light of the newly obtained 
information, is the expected utility of the best option higher than the EU of 
the best option (possibly an other one) determined without that information? 
In other words, is it worth the inevitable costs and efforts to conduct the test 
and to obtain the new information? This question can be answered as 
follows.107 
Taking into account the new information tx , the expected utility of 
                                                     
107
 Lindley, above n. 87; Raiffa, above n. 100; see also Graham, above n. 35. 
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‘Take Risk’ and ‘Avoid Risk’ can be written formally as: 
 
EU(Take Risk | tx) = p(H0 | tx).(ÚT0 - kt)+ p(H1 | tx).( ÚT1 - kt), and 
EU(Avoid Risk | tx) = p(H0 | tx).(ÚA0 – kt)+ p(H1 | tx).( ÚA1 – kt), 
 
whereby tx could be either tpos or tneg , Ú… (instead of U…) represents 
the revised utility of the four original decision consequences (Table 6), and 
kt indicates the costs (all-in) of conducting the test. The expected utility of 
the postponement option ‘get new information’ can be written as: 
 
EU(New Information) = p(tpos).Max{EU(Take Risk | tpos), EU(Avoid 
Risk | tpos)} + p(tneg).Max{EU(Take Risk | tneg), EU(Avoid Risk | tneg)}. 
 
If this ‘postpone and decide after test’ strategy appears to have a 
higher expected utility than the best option (Take Risk or Avoid Risk) 
without the test result, it is better to defer the original decision and to first 
collect new information.  
Thus, the value of new information about an uncertain-risk situation 
depends on the revision of the prior probability of serious harm into a 
posterior probability, the unconditional probability p(tx) of a particular test 
result, the all-in costs of acquiring the new information, and the possibly 
revised utilities: ÚT0 , ÚT1 , ÚA0 , ÚA1, of the four original consequences 
(Table 6). In other words, acquiring new or further information seems 
especially meaningful when:  
• one is a priori uncertain about which hypothesis is correct;  
• the test has a high diagnostic value (i.e. it may discriminate well between 
H1 and H0);  
• the test itself is not costly in terms of money, time, and effort; and/or 
• the test may lead to a more valid evaluation of the relevant decision 
consequences.  
 
4.4.6 Risk-risk tradeoffs 
 
Many authors have criticised the PP for being focused on the uncertain risks 
of particular, often controversial activities, such as using hazardous 
chemicals, GMOs, and nanotechnology.108 In an early critique, Bodansky 
                                                     
108
 J. Adler. ‘More sorry than safe: assessing the precautionary principle and the 
proposed international Biosafety Protocol’ (2000) 35 Texas International Law 
Journal 173; G. Calzada, C. Philippe and X. Méra, The precautionary principle: a 
high-risk principle - Institute of Economic Affairs: Economic Viewpoints (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers 2005); H.T. Engelhardt and F. Jotterand, ‘The precautionary 
principle: a dialectical reconsideration’ (2004) 29 Journal of Medicine and 
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wrote: ‘The precautionary principle seems to suggest that the choice is 
between risk and caution, but often the choice is between one risk and 
another’.109 
The gist of this persistent critique is well in line with the decision-
theoretic treatment presented above, requiring a weighing of possible false-
positive versus false-negative consequences. Basically, precaution – if called 
for – should result (and inevitably does result) from a decision between at 
least two alternatives: do/do not do, go/do not go, or permit/restrict. The fact 
that only one of these may involve a serious uncertain risk does not absolve 
the decision-maker from the task of weighing pros and cons, comparing 
risks, however difficult, and ordering his/her preferences about the available 
courses of action. Stern and Wiener conclude that: ‘Full portfolio-driven risk 
analysis can be a powerful counterweight to mission-driven agencies, 
passion for precaution, neglect of unintended consequences, and 
“groupthink”’.110 
An illustration of the need to trade off one type of risk against 
another is the case of GMOs in food production. Here the proposed tradeoff 
is between genetic contamination of natural ecosystems (around GMO 
fields) and the occurrence of large-scale food shortages, especially in poorer 
countries, due to insufficient crop harvests.111 Other examples are nuclear-
powered versus fossil-fuelled electricity generation – in view of radioactive 
waste versus global warming, and of course the USA’s pre-emptive war in 
Iraq.112 
 
4.5 Precautionary safety actions  
 
Immediate responses to uncertain-risk situations are meant to eliminate or 
reduce the threat, evade it, or effectively cope with its potential implications 
(e.g. a serious accident). Here, the search is for a type and degree of 
‘uncertain safety’ (as WRR, 2008, has titled its report) that would 
                                                                                                                            
Philosophy 301; Graham, above n. 35; IEM, above n. 24; Marchant, above n. 26; 
W.J. McKinney and H.H. Hill, ‘Of sustainability and precaution: the logical, 
epistemological, and moral problems of the precautionary principle and their 
implications for sustainable development’ (2000) 5 Ethics and the Environment 77; 
Weiss, above n. 20. 
109
 Bodansky, above n. 2, at 43. 
110
 Stern and Wiener, above n. 6, at 442. 
111
 Adler, above n. 109; Engelhardt and Jotterand, above n. 109; R. Hill, S. Johnston 
and C. Sendashonga, ‘Risk assessment and precaution in the Biosafety Protocol’ 
(2004) 13 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 
263. 
112
 Stern and Wiener, above n. 6. 
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compensate properly for the uncertain risk under consideration.113 
Separately, one may start further explorations aimed at reducing major 
uncertainties: for example, about choice alternatives, possible consequences, 
groups of people at risk, and optimal methods of eventual victim assistance. 
Through precautionary actions, the PP is applied as a control principle 
having the double character of both immediate protection and deeper 
investigation. 
Meeting the challenges of an uncertain risk head-on generally means 
that, at least for the time being, one adopts a restrictive strategy of early 
prevention or reduction of the possibilities and conditions of serious harm or 
damage, while trying to get risks As Low As Reasonably Achievable.114 
Given the uncertainties involved, this may best be done such that the 
activity, system, or situation under consideration becomes – or remains – 
robust, resilient, and flexible.115 Being practically precautious may be aimed 
either at reducing the threat or at enhancing victim protection, accompanied 
by further research. Orthogonal to this, precautionary actions may be 
organisational, technical, or behavioural in nature. Combining these two 
dimensions of practical action, we obtain the set of nine categories of 
specific possibilities given in Table 7.  
 
                                                     
113
 WRR, Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (Scientific Council for 
Government Policy), ‘Onzekere Veiligheid. Verantwoordelijkheden rond fysieke 
veiligheid’, (2008) [Uncertaint safety, responsibilities around physical safety.] (The 
Hague: WRR and Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press). 
114
 See for example ALARA; S. Lierman and L. Veuchelen, ‘The optimisation 
approach of ALARA in nuclear practice: An early application of the precautionary 
principle? Scientific uncertainty versus legal uncertainty and its role in tort law’ 
(2006) 15 European Environmental Law Review 98; O. Godard, ‘Justification, 
limitation, and ALARA as precursors of the precautionary principle’ in G. 
Eggermont and B. Feltz (eds.), Ethics and Radiological Protection (Louvain-la-
Neuve: Bruylant-Academia s.a. 2008) at 133; M.D. Rogers, ‘Risk analysis under 
uncertainty, the precautionary principle, and the new EU chemicals strategy’ (2003) 
37 Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology 370. 
115
 L. Clarke, ‘Worst-case thinking. An idea whose time has come. Invited 
comment’ (2005) XXIX Natural Hazards Observer 1; Klinke and Renn, above n. 
30; T. O’Riordan, J. Cameron and A. Jordan, ‘The evolution of the precautionary 
principle’ in T. O’Riordan, J. Cameron and A. Jordan (eds.), Reinterpreting the 
Precautionary Principle (London: Cameron & May 2001) at 9; Unesco-COMEST, 
above n. 41. 
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Table 7 Nine kinds of practical measures (illustrations) for realising 
precautionary safety  
 
Reducing the 
threat 
Enhancing 
victim protection 
Further research:  
topics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
rg
an
isa
tio
na
l 
 
Strenghening/enforc
ement of rules, 
standards, quota; 
introducing strict 
damage liability; 
changing, forgoing, 
prohibiting activity. 
 
Organising 
emergency aid; 
evacuation, area 
closure; 
communicating on 
self-help; supplying 
immediate practi-
calities; regular 
feedback. 
 
 
Supervisory 
management; 
revision of rules, 
standards, quota; 
effects and side-
effects of 
precautions; public 
health screening.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Te
ch
ni
ca
l 
 
Best avalailable 
control technology 
(BACT); spatial and 
temporal 
restrictions; 
reducing size or 
volume; adopting  
safer alternatives. 
 
Warning 
signs/labels, safety 
devices, survival 
packages, 
communication 
equipment, transport 
opportunities, 
evacuee 
accommodation. 
 
 
Safer technical 
design; feasible 
alternatives; self-
help products and 
facilities; 
technical/physical 
infrastructure for 
emergency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Be
ha
v
io
ur
a
l 
 
Organising group 
action for safety; 
reducing individual 
contributions to 
collective risk; 
urging authorities; 
assisting other 
potential victims.  
 
Avoiding risk 
exposure; shielding 
from immediate 
danger; assisting 
others and being 
prepared to offer 
medical first aid. 
 
Immediate self-
protection; 
motivation and 
capabilities of safety 
operators; 
risk/safety 
communication; 
social response to 
emergency. 
 
 
The lower left quadrant of Table 7, reducing the threat via 
behavioural measures, gains a special meaning when the uncertain risk under 
consideration is the collective outcome of numerous individual behaviours 
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such as, for example, fish consumption, car driving, or household energy 
use. To resolve such commons dilemmas, well-coordinated large-scale 
changes in individual behaviours are required.116 To promote social 
cooperation for the common good, one may not only wish to apply 
instrumental strategies for behaviour change (e.g. regulation, pricing and/or 
persuasion) but may also need to strengthen important effectiveness 
conditions, such as subjects’ problem awareness, the availability of 
behaviour alternatives, and a future perspective on a safer living 
environment.  
For all precautionary actions, careful monitoring and evaluation of 
their actual impact and effects is necessary for enhanced learning about the 
practical meaning and usefulness of precaution. As Borgers remarks, 
government protection of public safety against terrorist acts may well 
infringe (‘false-positively’) on democratic values and civil liberties.117 This 
poses political choice dilemmas whereby it is vital to know how effective 
(and side-effective) precautionary measures actually are or could be. Proper 
monitoring and evaluation is also needed to decide at some point when, 
where, and for whom current measures could be mitigated, withdrawn, or 
otherwise changed because new risk information has become available and 
important uncertainties have been reduced.118  
 
 
5 Largely procedural key issues of the PP 
 
Compared to the substantive issues 1-5 in Table 3, issues 6-10 are of 
secondary importance. However, they cover vital elements of an orderly 
procedure to apply the PP as an assessment, decision, and control principle 
for uncertain-risk situations. Each of these remaining issues is discussed 
briefly below, following their numbering in Table 3. 
 
                                                     
116
 G. Hardin, ‘The tragedy of the commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243; E. Ostrom 
and others (eds.), The drama of the commons (Washington D.C.: National Academy 
Press 2002); Ch. Vlek and L. Steg, ‘The commons dilemma as a practical model for 
research and policy making about environmental risks’ in G. Bartels and W. 
Nelissen (eds.), Marketing for sustainability. Towards transactional policy-making 
(Amsterdam, Berlin, Oxford: IOS Press 2002) at 205. 
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 Borgers, above n. 7. 
118
 C. Gollier and  N. Treich, ‘Decision-making under scientific uncertainty: the 
economics of the precautionary principle’ (2003) 27 The Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty 77; ILGRA, Interdepartmental Liaison Group on Risk Assessment, The 
precautionary principle, policy and application (London: UK Health and Safety 
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5.1 Issue 6: Optional versus obligatory precaution  
 
The necessity and the strength of precaution cannot but depend on the 
seriousness of the threat, judged by its possible consequences and their 
probability or plausibility. ‘Wait!’, ‘Don’t!’, ‘Defer!’, or ‘Do something 
else!’ are natural responses to avoid taking chances in potential-catastrophe 
situations. Thus the difference between ‘optional’ and ‘obligatory’ 
precaution can only be relative. Obligation, of course, also depends on the 
distribution of responsibilities, and power, among relevant authorities, 
entrepreneurs, and other expert safety managers. 
 
5.2 Issue 7: Who carries the burden of proof of risk or safety?  
 
Clearly, while safety cannot be proven, risk can.119 However, if the 
proponent of an uncertain-risk activity does not already believe him-/herself 
that precautions are needed and further safety research is required, the other 
parties involved may demand that the initiator of the activity demonstrate the 
likelihood of safety. Again, this shifting of the burden of proof should 
depend on the seriousness of the threat and, of course, on the ease with 
which the proponent of the activity might obtain and/or deliver the relevant 
data. Strong precaution, if called for, implies a stronger shift in the burden of 
proof than does weak precaution. Gollier and Treich, however, warn that 
producers in a competitive market may feel pressed to market new and 
uncertain-risk products before convincing safety research has been 
conducted.120 In such situations, precautionary government policies may be 
at variance with venturous free-market conditions. 
 
5.3 Issue 8: Further research and policy development  
 
This topic has already been formally discussed under the headings of 
Bayesian probability revision and value-of-information analysis; see Section 
4.4.4. The conclusions there should speak for themselves. However, 
uncertainties may spoil the direction and progress of an optimal information-
processing and policy-development strategy. Admittedly, safety tests may be 
costly and time-consuming, and opponents’ enduring concerns may be 
pressing proponents into ‘paralysis by analysis’.121 Nevertheless, a 
systematic consideration of the uncertain-risk problem at hand may 
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significantly facilitate a quick search for the most relevant data, possibly 
safer alternatives, and/or a revision of the original problem definition.122  
 
5.4 Issue 9: Multiparty communication and deliberation  
 
A comprehensive precautionary approach could well comprise elements that 
may be appreciated differently by different stakeholder groups. A natural 
strategy in such situations is to organise stakeholder meetings where diverse 
participants can exchange information, deliberate options, and try to 
formulate common preferences.  
However, as already mentioned in Section 4.4.1, the rationality of 
multiparty judgment and decision-making is limited. First, participant views 
should be ‘informed’ and well considered so that they can be taken seriously, 
particularly vis-à-vis expert scientific opinions.123 Second, conditions should 
enable participants to express common interests instead of strictly personal 
values. Even so, inconsistent social preferences may occur because of the 
impossibility of designing a practical method that simultaneously meets the 
three fundamental principles of collective-choice theory: rationality, equal 
participation, and decisiveness.124  
Since public-interest decisions must be made frequently anyway, 
there exist various pragmatic ways to resolve interindividual preference 
aggregation problems. Majority voting on at most two alternatives 
(‘yes/no’), consensus seeking through orderly deliberation, and some kind of 
benevolent leadership (formally ‘dictatorship’) are obvious solutions, each 
having its own strengths and weaknesses. However, theoretically as well as 
methodologically there is no guarantee that participative procedures lead to 
convergent results that might impress responsible authorities. Bekkers, 
Dijkstra, and others document the ‘democratic deficit’ of various new ways 
to compensate for the shortcomings of representative democracy.125 About 
‘environmental democracy’, Edwards concludes that pluralistic participation 
may enrich representative government, whereby elected officials may well 
function as process managers.126 
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5.5 Issue 10: Distribution of responsibilities  
 
Determining the need for, the nature of, and the proper execution of a 
precautionary strategy is a labour-intensive and time-consuming process. 
Key issues 1-5 in Table 3 specify the substantive focus of such a process, 
while issues 6-10 indicate procedural essentials. An obvious question here is: 
Who may best do what, and when? An organised answer follows the three 
phases of precautionary assessment, decision-making, and risk control, 
followed by coordination. 
Assessment comprises an initial problem definition, signalling the 
preliminary need for precaution, and estimating the probability or 
plausibility as well as the seriousness of possible harm. In addition, feasible 
choice alternatives with their likely benefits, costs, and risks may be 
identified. Through further investigation and deliberation, the problem 
definition may be revised such that hitherto unrecognised options and/or 
consequences are also incorporated. Assessment tasks are diverse enough to 
involve experts of various kinds, proponents and opponents of an activity, 
and responsible policy-makers. Available opinions and data may be 
collected and evaluated from different viewpoints, and different results may 
be aggregated and jointly discussed. Expert committees, proponent-opponent 
debates, and discussions about preliminary policy conclusions are feasible 
ways to achieve reasonable clarity and consensus about an overall 
assessment. 
Decision-making involves an evaluation and rank-ordering of some 
reasonably well-defined action versus inaction and perhaps further 
alternatives, such as more or less stringent packages of safety measures. One 
may also, quite rationally, postpone the decision proper and first obtain new 
information, especially about the nature and the likelihood of possible 
serious harm (see Section 4.4.4). Decision tasks are sensitive to participants’ 
goals and values and to their prior positions vis-à-vis the uncertain-risk 
problem. Some kind of systematic decision analysis may reveal specific 
uncertainties and/or differences in valuation, which might be resolved by 
further investigation, debate, and/or aggregation of judgments. Inevitably, 
any remaining controversy about the decision(s) to be made should be 
resolved by the competent authority. 
Control amounts to the careful execution of the chosen course of 
action under pre-specified safety conditions. Here, a general tendency of 
precaution following the ALARA principle would be obvious. Precautionary 
action may be organisational, technical, and/or behavioural in nature and it 
should be aimed at reducing the threat and/or enhancing victim protection. 
To improve future risk control, various further research and observation may 
also be undertaken (see Section 4.5). Control of uncertain risks could best be 
divided among the parties most responsible for particular risk factors (cf. 
Table 7). Depending on the nature of the uncertain risk and the location, the 
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sectors, and the persons potentially affected, relevant parties may each be 
assigned a significant role in reducing the threat and/or enhancing victim 
protection. 
Coordination properly carried out is necessary in the entire process 
of uncertain-risk assessment, decision, and control. Should this be somehow 
institutionalised? Should a formal protocol be developed and distributed 
among various relevant parties? Or should the competent authorities 
nominate an independent project group or steering committee? These 
questions need further consideration and experimentation in the field. 
 
 
6 Concluding questions and answers 
 
To clarify focal points for a precautionary-principled approach towards 
uncertain risk, this paper so far has emphasised the substantive meaning of 
the PP as an assessment, decision, and control principle. Let us put the 
paper’s conclusion in terms of several Questions and Answers. 
 Q1. Are there not often so many uncertainties that your only 
recourse is to a careful procedure? 
A1. No. Procedure can never make up for lack of substance, if only because 
participants in any procedure must know what to assess, decide about, and 
control, and how this could be usefully done. Good decision-making always 
depends on structure, content, and process regarding the problem at hand. 
Thus, a substantive-analytical framework for precautionary risk management 
seems indispensable for the careful management of uncertainties and a 
proper weighing of false positives versus false negatives.127 
Q2. Is a decision-theoretic perspective not too limited for handling 
uncertain-risk problems: for example, in consideration of the more extensive 
and long-term risk categories in Table 1? 
A2. Of course, but this goes for just about every theory or model of a 
complex phenomenon. However, decision theory – thoroughly and broadly 
developed since the 1950s – is a rich framework for systematising one’s 
thoughts, data, and judgments about more or less uncertain decision 
problems. In the quest for ‘rational’ applications of the PP, decision-
theoretic thinking may offer useful support, although it will never be 
sufficient.128 For more-encompassing and far-reaching uncertain-risk 
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problems (as in Table 1), decision-theoretic discipline – including issues of 
spatial-temporal discounting – may enhance the quality of procedures while 
reducing the risk of participants losing the forest among the trees. 
Q3. Should the PP be considered a normative principle? 
A3. No, at least not distinctly. Precautionary behaviour and the preceding 
decision(s) may be rational survival strategies based on human goals and 
values. Ideological disputes about the PP are often rooted in differing views 
about the long-term sustainability of particular technologies and/or 
behaviour patterns. Understandably, serious uncertain-risk situations may 
appeal to more fundamental (‘ethical’) values than do more familiar risk 
problems. 
Q4. Could the PP not be formulated as a rule of law, clearly 
identifying the conditons, actors, and obligations involved?129 
A4. No. As a general principle the PP reflects the wisdom of prudence in 
risk assessment, decision-making, and risk control. Its very generality allows 
for, and invites, well-tuned elaboration for various domains. Decision-
theoretic instrumentation may serve to clarify the judgments, choices, and 
actions required. 
Q5. Why should we apply the PP if we have such sophisticated 
approaches towards risk assessment and management?  
A5. The sophistication of safety can be significantly enhanced by conceiving 
‘risk’ as a multistage process, accounting for plural roles and 
responsibilities, and incorporating precaution as a logical response to 
increasing uncertainty. As indicated in Section 2, modern ‘risk governance’ 
and precautionary safety management seem to be gradually converging. 
From a decision-theoretic perspective this is inevitable if one accepts that 
uncertainty about risk is a continuous, not a dichotomous variable.130 
Q6. What are vital research questions about the practical meaning 
and application of the PP? 
A6. First, what are different people’s (or groups’ and organisations’) gut 
responses to uncertain-risk situations that are systematically varied in 
benefits-at-stake, worst-case consequence, uncertainty of ‘disaster’, and 
immediacy versus delay of possible disaster? 
Second, what would people deliberately expect, and what would 
they favour, by way of common-authoritative measures to assess, decide 
about, and control collective uncertain risks? 
Third, which policy domains are most burdened with uncertain risks, 
which safety measures (if any) are in place, and how effective are or were 
these? Which domains and types of uncertain risk elicit most public concern, 
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and why? 
Fourth, what are the merits and drawbacks – in different domains – 
of various specific precautionary strategies (cf. Table 7) such as technical 
facilities, behavioural education, lawful regulation, and financial incentives? 
Q7. Should the PP not be rejected for its basic ‘pessimism’ whereby 
innovation may be stifled and society might become largely scrupulous and 
conservative? 
A7. No. Being precautious is a time-honoured social and behavioural 
strategy vis-à-vis serious threats. The pressures from uncertain risk should 
lead to preventive anticipation, deeper reflection, better-balanced decisions, 
and stronger, more flexible control. Pessimism, like optimism, can very well 
be a rational strategy, depending on what is at stake. But, agreed, ‘fear is a 
bad counsellor’, and optimism is often necessary to maintain or restore self-
confidence.131 Would hope be a better counsellor? 
 
 
                                                     
131
 R. Pieterman, De voorzorgscultuur. Streven naar Veiligheid in een Wereld vol 
Risico en Onzekerheid [The Precautionary Culture. Striving for Safety in a World 
full of Risks and Uncertainty] (The Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2008) at 200. 
